Abstract
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the Cold War, programs and interventions associated with both international peacebuilding and transitional justice have increasingly followed in war's wake.' Today, there is a growing demand for post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives, partly for humanitarian reasons, and partly for strategic reasons arising out of the conceptualization of failed and conflict states as a global security issue.
2 At the same time, the growth of transitional justice practices may be creating a "justice cascade," a new global norm of accountability that helps give rise to new trials and truth commissions year after year. 3 More and more, the question is not whether there will be some kind of programmatic linkages between peacebuilding and transitional justice.
1 " Some in those communities have called for better coordination in order to facilitate complementarity." At a policy level, there are early indications that this is in fact taking place. For example, in 2006 the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations set forth guidance encouraging greater linkages between DDR programming and transitional justice. 12 Together with this new enthusiasm, some have urged caution, pointing to the need to manage potentially significant tensions between peacebuilding and transitional justice projects and programs."
Building peace with justice is a complex and long-term endeavor that calls for holistic solutions that address crosscutting challenges. While peacebuilding is ultimately a broader notion, both peacebuilding and transitional justice are openended concepts with substantial overlap that "are contrived to achieve a common purpose": long-term positive peace.
14 Both seek to rebuild social trust and social capital and attempt to address problems of governance, accountability, and the need for institutional reform. To these same ends, promoting synergies between peacebuilding and transitional justice programs and initiatives is a worthwhile goal for policymakers, academics, and practitioners alike. Indeed, the UN has recently overhauled its "peacebuilding architecture" with the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) precisely to avoid fragmented and duplicative efforts in the peacebuilding arena, broadly conceived. 1 And yet, as this Article will argue, developing more integrated approaches to peace and justice issues in the post-conflict context may create its own problems and challenges. In particular, there is a danger that as transitional justice is mainstreamed into emerging best practices for post-conflict reconstruction by the PBC and other UN policy organs, together with DDR, SSR, rule of law assistance, and elections, it will increasingly come to be seen as yet one more box to tick on the "post-conflict checklist," a routine part of the template deployed in the context of post-conflict peace operations. 6 In this regard, it is worth noting that traditional international peacebuilding programs-including DDR, SSR, and rule of law assistance-as well as a number of transitional justice initiatives have been subject to powerful, parallel critiques: that they are too often externally driven, being planned and implemented in a top-down and state-centric manner that gives insufficient voice and agency to those most affected by the conflict; 7 that they are biased toward Western approaches, giving too little attention to local or indigenous peace and justice traditions; 8 that they are presented as technocratic, neutral, and The problem of template-based or one-size-fits-all peacebuilding initiatives is a frequent trope in both academic and policy literature. See, for example, Roger Mac Ginty, Indigenous Peace-Making versus the liberal Peace, 43 Cooperation and Conflict: J of the Nordic Intl Studies Assn 139, 144 (2008) (observing the existence of "set templates" and a "formulaic path" in internationally sponsored peacebuilding); Edward Newman, 'Liberal"Peacebuilding Debates, in Newman, Paris, and Richmond, eds, New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding 2 6, 42 (cited in note 2) (noting that "[a] core problem of contemporary peacebuilding is its tendency to be formulaic"); International Crisis Group, Liberia and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States, Crisis Group Africa Report No 87 at 9 (2004) (criticizinga mechanistic "operational checklist" approach to post-conflict peacebuilding in which the international community assumes it can safely withdraw after rote implementation of a series of initiatives: deployment of peacekeeping troops, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, the repatriation and return of refugees and internally displaced persons, security sector and judicial reform, transitional justice initiatives, and, finally, a first election). Sharp apolitical solutions to highly contested or contestable political issues and choices;" and that they ultimately reflect not local needs and realities, but a dominant "liberal international peacebuilding" paradigm that seeks to foster Western, market-oriented democracies in the wake of conflict without considering the tensions this may unleash in the immediate aftermath of conflict. 20 Considered together, there is reason to worry that better integration and coordination between peacebuilding and transitional justice might exacerbate some of the tendencies that have given rise to these parallel critiques rather than alleviate them. As academics and policymakers begin to sound out linkages and synergies, viewing transitional justice and peacebuilding overlaps through the prism of these critiques might help us to strengthen policies that seek to promote complementarity. At the same time, addressing some of these critiques may cast doubt upon the prospects of more coordinated approaches to post-conflict peacebuilding altogether. The types of locally owned, context-specific, and bottom-up solutions frequently advocated in the literature may take us beyond the "post-conflict checklist," but they also call into question the role of international organizations and international standards that are typically part and parcel of international post-conflict assistance. Yet from a pragmatic and realist standpoint, a balance between local and international agency in post-conflict programming seems both inevitable and desirable, and both "locals" and "internationals" have a stake in finding creative solutions to peacebuilding and transitional justice challenges, and learning from and applying the lessons of best practices elsewhere. 21 Ultimately, striking a better balance might involve more hybridized forms of peacebuilding and transitional justice that involve a mixture of conventional and local practices and models.' While this Article will not attempt to set forth a 34 (2009) comprehensive and integrated approach along these lines, it will argue that attentiveness to some of the parallel critiques leveled against both peacebuilding and transitional justice interventions could lead to shifts that would strengthen policy in both areas in the process of promoting linkages. The possibility of integrating local reconciliation practices into both transitional justice mechanisms and reintegration schemes for former combatants is one such possibility that will be briefly examined in this Article.
This Article will proceed in five sections. In Section II, I discuss the origins and evolution of both peacebuilding and transitional justice since the end of the Cold War. In Section 1II, I evaluate some of the broad and parallel critiques that have been leveled against peacebuilding and transitional justice. In Section IV, I examine the possibility for greater coordination between peacebuilding and transitional justice, looking to potential tensions and complementarity at a programmatic level, particularly through the lens of the longstanding critiques discussed in Section III. I argue that greater attention to these critiques might help to inspire modes of coordination and complementarity that will avoid some of the dangers of a standardized, checklist approach to post-conflict peacebuilding. Section V concludes the Article.
II. ORIGINS AND GROWTH OF PEACEBUILDING AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
The growth and expansion of international peacebuilding efforts associated with the end of the Cold War has been paralleled by an explosion of interest in the various mechanisms associated with transitional justice. In post-conflict countries today, there is an increased likelihood that at least some of the various programs and initiatives associated with both international peacebuilding and transitional justice will be marshaled as part of a response to violent conflict. The following section briefly outlines the origins of both fields with a view to understanding the critiques that will be discussed in Section III of this Article.
A. The Growth and Expansion of Peace Operations
With the end of the Cold War, the world experienced a rapid expansion in international peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and UN peace operations quickly grew in both sophistication and complexity. The thick, multidimensional mandates associated with UN missions today stand in contrast to the relatively thin approaches previously taken. During the Cold War, peacekeeping actions placed a premium on neutrality, consent, and minimum
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Sarp force-notions all central to traditional conceptions of sovereignty.
23 So-called "first generation" 24 or consensual peacekeeping often involved interposition of forces for the monitoring of ceasefires geared toward containing conflicts and maintaining stability.
2 5 Such practices were largely based on the felt importance of maintaining international security between states as opposed to the intra-state conflict and civil wars that we often associate with conflict today. 26 Rather than attempting to address "root causes" or to resolve conflict, the driving idea was to contain international instability in an era when a larger confrontation between great powers was to be avoided at all costs.
If these early peacekeeping efforts were relatively minimalist and involved the avoidance of domestic politics, the end of the Cold War brought about a huge shift in the approach to conflict management, and the UN increasingly found itself called upon in these next generation initiatives to address underlying economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems premised on the idea that managing the often internal conflicts of the post-Cold War world required a multi-faceted approach. Thus, from managing conflict between states, there was a shift to the perceived need to build peace within states, from traditional acts of peacekeeping authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, 2 to more complex, and, from a traditional Westphalian perspective, more intrusive acts ofpeacebuilding that were frequently authorized under Chapter VII. 28 This shift was bolstered by the belief that threats to security come not just from interstate wars, but also from weak, failing, and conflict-prone states, and, particularly in the post-9/1 1 world, non-state actors. 29 The concept of "post-conflict peacebuilding" that has come to be associated with multi-dimensional UN peace operations is often attributed to UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and his 1992 Agenda for Peace report, which defined it as "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict." 3 Since that time, the concept has been institutionalized across a number of organizations outside of the UN system that use it to frame and organize a variety of post-conflict activities. 31 The term has come to comprise efforts to disarm previously warring parties, reintegrate former soldiers into society, demine and destroy weapons, rebuild the security and judicial sectors, repatriate or resettle refugees, and engage in various forms of democracy and governance assistance, including monitoring elections. 32 Twenty years after the UN offered its initial definition, the term peacebuilding has, if anything, come to be construed in even more expansive terms. According to a recent UN working definition, peacebuilding "involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development., 33 This definition is spectacularly broad and, together with the shift from first to successive generations of peacekeeping, could be seen as demonstrating a growing commitment on the part of the UN system to the idea of building "positive peace," rather than simply maintaining "negative peace., 34 The increasingly broad mandates and obligations of UN peacekeeping missions across the world to include various aspects of peacebuilding and statebuilding 35 were not initially met with a significant evolution of the UN's institutional doctrine or structure, leading to redundant and ad hoc efforts and a Vol. 14 No. 1 together, transitional justice is often said to be both backward looking, insofar as it is closely associated with justice and accountability for previous human rights violations, and forward looking, insofar as its advocates often claim that justice is essential to prevent recurrence and to lay the groundwork for longer term peace and stability. 4 ' As with peacebuilding, the birth and rapid growth of transitional justice is closely associated with political currents near the end of the Cold War. Specifically, as a field of policy, practice, and study, transitional justice has its origins in the so-called "third wave" of democratic transitions that swept Eastern Europe and Latin America in the late 1980s and 1990s. 4 2 Indeed, the origins of transitional justice in the deliberations of how new democracies ought to respond to massive human rights violations is key to understanding the parameters and practices of the field. 43 Early thinking about justice in transition often focused on the need to deliver enough justice to contribute to building a new democratic order, without at the same time endangering the democratic transition itself." Like its parent field of human rights, transitional justice was preoccupied with accountability for abuses. It also sought to achieve justice in 
Sharp ways that would facilitate a transition not just to democracy but to something resembling Western liberal democracy. 4 "
In the quarter century that has followed the emergence of transitional justice discourse and practice, it has evolved from a discourse of exception and deviation-something thought to be different from ordinary forms of justice to be deployed on an ad hoc basis during a period of rupture-to something that has in many ways been institutionalized, regularized, and mainstreamed. 4 6 Increasingly, the question is not whether some kind of justice will be delivered during periods of transition but what the sequencing and modalities might be. 47 The upward trajectory and expansion of the field are in part reflected in its embrace by a landmark 2004 report by the UN secretary-general. 48 Indeed, over the last twenty years, the UN system as a whole has become heavily involved in a number of transitional justice processes around the world. The international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) were both created by the Security Council. In Sierra Leone, East Timor, Cambodia, Bosnia, and Lebanon, the UN created hybrid international tribunals. Today, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has the lead responsibility for transitional justice issues, having supported transitional justice
45
See Arthur, 31 Hum Rts Q at 325-26 (cited in note 42) (arguing that transition to democracy was the "dominant normative lens" through which political change was viewed in the early years of transitional justice practice and scholarship); see also Vol. 14 No. 1 programs in some twenty countries around the world. 49 The Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) at the UN Development Programme also works to support transitional justice efforts. Although it does not have an explicit mandate to work on transitional justice issues and its record of practice is only beginning to be established, the newly created PBC has already identified support for transitional justice initiatives as key to peacebuilding. 5°A s transitional justice practices have become increasingly normalized and embraced by key global institutions like the UN, the field has begun to move beyond its roots and association with the political transitions of the late 1980s and 1990s to Western liberal democracy, and it has become associated with postconflict peacebuilding situations more generally, even including those that do not involve a liberal transition. 5 
I1. PARALLEL CRITIQUES OF PEACEBUILDING AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
As post-conflict peacebuilding and transitional justice have expanded and to some degree become both normalized and institutionalized in the post-Cold War era, they have also been subject to trenchant critiques from academics, activists, and policymakers. While the programs associated with international peacebuilding assistance, such as DDR and SSR, have historically had little connection to transitional justice initiatives, either in terms of theory or policy and practice, many of the critiques leveled against international efforts in both domains strongly echo each other. Particularly given calls for greater linkages between peacebuilding and transitional justice, these parallel critiques bear close examination.
I have grouped the critiques into three loose general categories below: (a) the critique of liberal international peacebuilding; (b) the critique of politics as neutral technology; and (c) the debate about local versus international. These groupings are not meant to be definitive, and the critiques explored below are in no way exhaustive. For some scholars, such as Roland Paris, these critiques should all be disentangled from each other and do not necessarily go hand in hand. 5 Vol. 14 No. 1
Beyond the Post-Conlict Checklist often share substantial overlap but that the groupings nevertheless serve a useful role for purposes of discussion and analysis.
A. The Critique of Liberal International Peacebuilding
For the last two decades, international post-conflict peacebuilding efforts have most often taken place in developing rather than developed countries. o For explanation, one could point to evidence suggesting that poor countries are more prone to civil wars, but a fuller understanding would also need to account for the entrenched global power dynamics and Security Council vetoes that make interventions predicated on building peace and justice more likely in the smaller, poorer countries of the world. 6 1 Given these trends, it appears that both peacebuilding and transitional justice interventions will have a greater footprint in the developing world than the developed world for the foreseeable future. 62 With these broad trends as a backdrop, the critique of liberal international peacebuilding posits that in practice, peacebuilding interventions have largely been premised on a model of liberal internationalism that conceives of market-oriented economies and Western-style liberal democracy as the unique pathway to peace. 63 The interventions contrived to bring about just such a liberal peace are seen to constitute a sort of modem-day mission civilisatrice. 4 Yet because many of the post-conflict and developing countries in which peacebuilding interventions take place have a historical and cultural grounding that varies from that of the Occident, some argue that the emphasis on elections, democracy, and free markets associated with the typical package of post-conflict peacebuilding 
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Sharp interventions can be both dangerous and destabilizing. 6 " The critique suggests they are potentially dangerous and destabilizing because rapid economic and political liberalization can give rise to grievances and political competition with which the often fragile or shattered institutions in post-conflict countries are as yet too weak to cope. 66 The combined effects of peace operations and development assistance facilitated by liberalizing international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund may therefore be to create instability and even a return to conflict. 6 For this reason, some critics of liberal international peacebuilding have advocated "institutionalization before liberalization," a focus on strengthening the institutions of economic and political governance prior to full liberalization. 68 Of course, the disastrous rush to elections as a departure strategy that has been associated with some early UN peace operations has in fact been moderated in recent years with an increased emphasis on institution building, including broad categories of programming such as rule of law assistance, DDR, and SSR. 69 Nevertheless, some critics argue that even in its current form, international peacebuilding may involve the imposition of Western institutional preferences that, at their core, are still largely premised on "neoliberal policies of open markets . . . and governance policies focused on enhancing instruments of state coercion." ' Equally worrisome, the strongest critics argue, is that there is little space to dissent from the prevailing and hegemonic international peacebuilding paradigm. 1 Applying the critique of liberal international peacebuilding to transitional justice, Chandra Sriram argues that mainstream justice strategies "share key assumptions about preferable arrangements, and a faith that other key goods-democracy, free markets, 'justice'-can essentially stand in for, and necessarily create peace." 72 To the contrary, Sriram argues that transitional justice processes and mechanisms may, like liberal peacebuilding, destabilize post-conflict and post-atrocity countries because "calls for justice are likely to generate tensions and exacerbate conflicts that have the potential to undermine peacebuilding. And as with the other components of liberal peacebuilding, transitional justice strategies are often rooted in Western modalities of justice imposed from the outside. 74 While transitional justice processes have historically been linked to an emphasis on building Western-style democracies, these processes have not traditionally been associated with the push for free markets. 7
1 Sriram therefore notes that transitional justice might not be as subject to this aspect of the critique of liberal international peacebuilding. 76 However, it is worth noting that while trials and truth commissions around the world have tended to focus on accountability for violations of physical integrity (murder, rape, torture, disappearances) and civil and political rights more generally, issues of economic and distributive justice and economic and social rights, have often been placed in the background of transitional justice practice and concern. 77 The effect has at times generated outrage over acts of physical violence conceived of as exceptional evils, while leaving the larger economic and social status quo intact, perhaps thereby obfuscating and legitimating patterns of economic violence that may be equally devastating." In this sense, transitional justice has paralleled the neoliberal market orientation that is featured in the critique of liberal international peacebuilding. Thus, it would seem that the paradigmatic "third wave" transitions at the origins of transitional justice, transitions from authoritarianism and communism to market-oriented, Western-style democracy, were crucial not only to structuring the initial conceptual boundaries of the field but also remain relevant to understanding the field's existing practices today. 
B. Politics as Neutral Technology
A second criticism of both international peacebuilding and transitional justice that is related to but distinguishable from the critique of liberal international peacebuilding is the argument that that they are both presented as technocratic, neutral, and apolitical solutions to highly contested or contestable political issues and choices. In other words, the choice as to the modalities of better forms of governance and questions that arise out of a desire for justice (for example, justice for whom, for what, and to what ends?) are highly political choices that have important consequences for the distribution of political, economic, social, and cultural power in the post-conflict context.80 Yet, a perennial feature of the various components of post-conflict peacebuilding, such as rule of law and democracy assistance, is that they are often imagined as fundamentally apolitical and neutral technologies-a misperception that obfuscates the difficult tradeoffs that need to be made to further important post-conflict objectives such as development, security, and human rights protection." Thus, critics of both peacebuilding and transitional justice have argued that the fundamentally political nature of both enterprises needs to be brought to the surface. 82 The need to more openly assess the tensions, tradeoffs, and debates that undergird peacebuilding and transitional justice interventions is all the more plain if we take seriously the notion that they serve to replicate essentially Western liberal economic and governance models. In this regard, it is important to examine the discourse of the local that has emerged in recent years in the critique of both peacebuilding and transitional justice. 19) (arguing that the "rise in interventionism, based on Western conceptions of justice, has also been paralleled by reluctance on the part of many rule of law experts to acknowledge the political dimensions of such activities" and that "[expressing transitional justice questions as a series of technical issues offsets this potentially troubling recognition'); Leebaw, 30 Hum Rts Q at 98-106 (cited in note 6) (arguing that the seeming consensus as to the goals of transitional justice masks a deeper politicization and debate, but that it has become difficult to assess the tensions, trade-offs, and dilemmas associated with transitional justice to the extent that they have been re-conceptualized in apolitical terms).
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Beyond the Post-Conflict Checklist C. The "Local" versus the "International"
A third set of concerns leveled against both international peacebuilding and transitional justice broadly addresses the extent to which an appropriate balance has been struck between the "local" and the "international" in terms of agency, input, and authority over post-conflict planning and programming. Concerns about striking the right balance take a number of rhetorical forms, and include the worry that post-conflict agendas are "externally driven," that they are planned and implemented in a "top-down" manner, or otherwise fail to give sufficient agency to local actors with respect to core issues and choices. 83 A related concern is the extent to which mainstream peacebuilding and transitional justice initiatives are biased toward Western approaches, giving too little attention to local practices of promoting peace, justice, and reconciliation. 84 In recent years, exploration of the complexity of the discourse of the local has experienced renewed interest in academic circles. 8 " At rhetorical level at least, the importance of local or national ownership has now become a virtual UN mantra in official policy documents. 86 Yet despite all of the attention, the precise meaning of the discourse of local ownership in peacebuilding remains imprecise and poorly understood. 87 Broadly speaking, the mobilization of the concept of the local in the context of peacebuilding debates might be viewed as an argument over strategy 
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Sharp in which context-specific solutions are pitted against a perceived standardization or a checklist approach to post-conflict programming. 88 Yet the discourse of the local could also be thought of as one of resistance to the perceived hegemony of liberal international peacebuilding itself insofar as it is conceived of or forms part of a larger effort to reconstitute post-conflict societies in the image of Western liberal democracies. At a deeper level, the local versus international debate might also be thought to capture one of the essential dilemmas and contradictory goals of post-conflict interventions in general. That is, while such interventions must be responsive to local context, traditions, and political dynamics in order to be perceived as legitimate, they often seek to challenge and transform many of the dynamics that may have led to the conflict in the first place, which can include traditional practices and power structures. 89 Even were this not the case, in the immediate post-conflict aftermath, the very local political and cultural structures that might have ordinarily served as an interface point between the local and the international have often broken down, making it that much more difficult to find the ideal balance between local and international agency. Indeed, the very notion of intervention is predicated on some idea of local failure, which may imply the need for something outside of the local to set things right again. Along with the rise of the discourse of the local in academic and policy circles, many are quick to warn that it is important not to essentialize or romanticize the local. 90 In the field of transitional justice, for example, local justice and reconciliation practices have in some instances accompanied more standard (or Western) transitional justice interventions in intriguing ways that hint at great potential for furthering reconciliation and accountability. 9 At the same time, local practices can occasionally be difficult to reconcile with international principles. 92 Supposedly local practices may also be subject to Vol. 14 No. 1
capture by elites who would use them for their own political purposes. In Rwanda, for example, the local dispute-settlement practice of gacaca was modified and adopted at a national level to address justice and reconciliation issues that followed in the wake of the 1994 genocide. While this development was initially heralded by some, it has also been observed that gacaca has been implemented in ways that, while they serve the interests of the Kagame government, may not fully serve the needs of community justice and reconciliation. 93 Thus, as the Rwanda case illustrates, the turn to the local in matters of peacebuilding and transitional justice offers no easy solutions, and ultimately the concepts of both local and international might be marshaled to further important emancipatory goals in the post-conflict context. 
IV. BUILDING LINKAGES BETWEEN PEACEBUILDING AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
Although international peacebuilding and transitional justice efforts parallel each other in many ways, ranging from shared historical origins in post-Cold War dynamics and political currents to similarities in the sharp critiques that these efforts have generated, peace and justice initiatives have not always been seen to walk hand in hand. Indeed, over the last twenty-five years, the "peace versus justice" debate, in which the imperatives of justice are thought to threaten possibilities for peace and stability, has proved to be an enduring one, seeming to erupt nearly every time an international tribunal indicts a high-level official or former warlord. 
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Perhaps in part as a result of these perceived tensions, scholars and practitioners of transitional justice have not historically tended to ground their research or praxis in vocabularies of peace or peacebuilding. 96 To a large extent, the connections between peacebuilding and transitional justice have been "under-researched." 97 Yet despite these historic tensions, current UN doctrine holds that peace and justice are mutually supportive, even if the timing, modalities, and sequencing of peace and justice initiatives need to be carefully considered.
9 8 More recent transitional justice scholarship has tended to play down the potential for conflict between peace and justice. 99 At the same time, the shared space and common goals of peacebuilding and transitional justice in the post-conflict context have led to an increasing interest by both academics and policymakers in exploring the possibilities for linkages and complementarity.
1 00
A. Acknowledging Both Tensions and Complementarity
Given many of the shared goals of peacebuilding and transitional justice-rebuilding social trust and social capital, addressing problems of governance and accountability, and fostering institutional reform, to name only a few-the desire to promote linkages and complementarity seems eminently sensible. And yet, a closer examination reveals that many of the traditional programmatic components of international post-conflict peacebuilding have the potential to both complement and conflict with transitional justice initiatives. 1 0 1
96
See Andrieu, 41 Security Dialogue at 539 (cited in note 17) (noting that "few transitional justice
scholars have yet situated their research in the context of peacebuilding, seeing it instead through the dominant lens of legalism and human rights'); Lambourne, 3 Ind J Transitional Just at 29 (cited in note 18) (noting that "few researchers have analyzed the relationship between justice, reconciliation and peacebuilding"). A notable exception to this trend is Rama Mani whose pioneering work took a much more holistic approach to issues of justice and peace in the postconflict context. See generally Mani, 2 lntl J Transitional Just 253 (cited in note 52).
97
See van Zyl, Promoting Transitional Justice at 210 (cited in note 7).
98
See UN Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies at 8, 21 (cited in note 9).
As but two examples, I briefly outline here the potential for tension and complementarity between transitional justice and programs relating to the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants and security sector reform more generally.
In the last twenty years, DDR programs have become a regular feature of post-conflict peacebuilding.°2 Of recent peacekeeping missions, at least seven of those established by the UN Security Council included DDR in their mandate. 0 3 While programs vary in terms of their modalities, the basic goal of all such programs is to assure security and stability in the post-conflict context by removing weapons from the hands of former combatants and helping them to integrate socially and economically into society. 0 4 If done well, DDR programs have the potential to contribute to the very stability that might be thought essential to getting larger development and justice initiatives off the ground. While few would therefore dispute the need for such programs, they have often been criticized for a short-term "guns for cash" approach that may shortchange some of the longer-term and more challenging goals of DDR, particularly the reintegration of former combatants back into the community.
05
Despite increasingly global experience and expertise with DDR, it has been hard to overlook the disappointing results of many DDR programs, ultimately leading the UN and others to stress the need for a more "integrated" approach." 6 But while more integrated approaches sound laudable in the abstract, such efforts have the potential to create enormous challenges when dealing with fields such as DDR and transitional justice that, historically, have enjoyed few connections at the level of policy and practice. 0 7 The historical separation between DDR and transitional justice may in part reflect a perception that they are meant to serve different constituencies for different purposes. Thus, while transitional justice mechanisms are often viewed as victim oriented, DDR is seen to serve the needs of former perpetrators.' 8 While transitional justice focuses on justice and accountability for past violations, traditional approaches to DDR focus on military and security objectives.°W ith this backdrop in mind, it is not hard to imagine that the existence of robust accountability mechanisms might make some former combatants reluctant to come forward and lay down their arms. Moreover, to the extent that those who need to be disarmed are either embedded in state security forces or stand to be integrated into reconstituted state security forces as part of a larger SSR program, this too makes the prospects for restoration of the rule of law difficult since the very forces responsible for enforcing the law have the most to lose from the accountability measures that are part and parcel of transitional justice." 0 Beyond this, the provision of reinsertion and reintegration benefits to former combatants, a typical feature of many DDR programs, can be contrasted with the relative paucity and lack of generosity of reparations programs for victims."' The perception that former perpetrators are being rewarded for bad behavior while former victims are left to fend for themselves could ultimately make reintegration and reconciliation initiatives difficult."' Taken together, there is ample potential for tension between DDR programs and transitional justice initiatives. However, despite the potential to work at cross-purposes, DDR programs and transitional justice mechanisms also share common goals, including trust-building, prevention of renewed violence, and reconciliation." 3 In terms of furthering these common goals, there are a number of areas of potential complementarity, particularly as regards the reintegration component of DDR programs. For example, while there is some evidence to suggest that parallel DDR and transitional justice initiatives might decrease former combatants willingness to come forward and engage in truth telling and reconciliation activities, it can also be argued that sending a strong public signal that only the "big fish" will be put on trial might allow victims to feel justice is being done, while at the same time making it clear that most combatants were not among the worst offenders and can be reconciled to their community. 1 4 Beyond community-level reconciliation, which will be discussed in more detail in the next section, building stronger linkages between DDR and transitional justice would likely involve a greater focus on human rights vetting to ensure that abusive former combatants are not channeled into reconstituted security services."' This mechanism, along with other accountability mechanisms, could ultimately enhance the credibility and legitimacy of the new forces, while at the same time lowering the chances of recurrence of abuses by the reformed security forces, even if the potential for some short-term frictions cannot be eliminated.
16
SSR is a process that could be thought to include DDR but which is at the same time much broader and more comprehensive. While definitions of SSR vary in scope, the UN generally understands it to comprise efforts to promote "effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without 
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Sharp between SSR programs and transitional justice initiatives. "8 The potential for conflict between members of the security sector, who risk possibly being downsized or excluded through vetting procedures, and transitional justice, which seeks to promote accountability and truth-telling for abusive members of those same security forces, is fairly straightforward and obvious. At the same time, without security and stability, accountability mechanisms associated with transitional justice will have difficulty functioning. Thus, the basic tension between the felt needs of stability and security on the one hand, and the exigencies of accountability and human rights on the other, renders the already complicated task of reforming or reconstituting the security sector all the more challenging. Perhaps in part due to this potential for tension, SSR and transitional justice "rarely interact, either in practice or in theory."' 9 Despite these tensions, it would be difficult to foster effective and accountable security "with full respect for human rights and the rule of law"' 2°w ithout some attention to issues of past abuses and impunity. In particular, attention to these issues through both transitional justice and SSR mechanisms has the potential to provide a much-needed sense of legitimacy for formerly abusive security forces. ' This, together with other potential avenues of complementarity, has given rise to a small but growing literature exploring the possibility of a "justice-sensitive" approach to SSR that would include, among other things, more robust human rights training and vetting. 22 Thus, as with DDR, building better linkages between SSR and transitional justice could ultimately promote trust building, prevention of renewed violence, and reconciliation.
As defined by some global institutions, the "security sector" extends well beyond traditional security actors like the police and the military to management and oversight bodies, broader justice and rule of law institutions, and nonstatutory security forces. 123 It is particularly in this broader conception of security sector reform, with its inclusion of the judicial sector and access to justice, that the potentially positive linkages between SSR and transitional justice might be more apparent. Therefore, while not always thought of as being part of SSR, Vol. 14 No. 1 programs that ensure access to justice, particularly access to justice for those abused by security forces, could be one way of fostering accountability longterm, and maintaining sustained "bottom-up" pressure for reform on the security sector as a whole.' 24 B. Building Linkages through the Lens of Critique
The potential for both conflict and complementarity between transitional justice and peacebuilding initiatives highlights the need for coordination sufficient to mitigate tensions and promote positive overlaps. Indeed, recognition of the need to promote coherence and integration while avoiding the fragmented and duplicative approaches of the past helped in part to inspire the creation of the PBC in 2005.125 The many challenges associated with building peace and justice in the post-conflict context call for holistic solutions that address crosscutting challenges. For these reasons, this Article takes it as a starting point that promoting synergies between peacebuilding and transitional justice programs and initiatives is a worthwhile goal. At the same time, despite the seemingly unobjectionable nature of appeals for greater coordination, more integrated approaches to peace and justice issues in the post-conflict context may also create problems and challenges of their own.
To begin, the UN's historic track record on coordination leaves ample room for improvement, and initial assessments of the PBC's ability to promote more integrated approaches to complex and multi-dimensional peacebuilding challenges have not been optimistic.
12 6 Further complicating the task of coordination is the fact that post-conflict peacebuilding is a large and multifaceted task, with key roles being played by a variety of actors. Though this Article has focused largely on the UN, the larger post-conflict peacebuilding picture also includes actors over which the PBC has no direct authority, ranging from the World Bank and key bilateral donors such as the US, the EU, and Japan to national governments, civil society actors, and various local constituencies. Getting actors both in and outside of the UN system to work towards more integrated approaches to post-conflict peacebuilding is an 125 See General Assembly Res No 60/180 at 1 (cited in note 37); Security Council Res No 1645 at 1 (cited in note 37) (emphasizing the need for a "coordinated, coherent, and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation"); Jubilut, 9 Minn J Intl L at 31 (cited in note 36) (discussing the problem of redundant and ad hoc efforts and a lack of coordination in peacekeeping missions of the past). 
Shaip enormous task, especially given the stove-piping, overlapping mandates, and bureaucratic territorialism that have plagued such efforts in the past. 12 It is important to note that coordination difficulties stem not only from the magnitude of the task or difficulties of communication amongst all of the various players, but also because of underlying disagreements and uncertainties as to how to best accomplish peacebuilding objectives in the first place.
12
Second, beyond the inherent challenges of large-scale coordination itself, there is a danger of over-standardization and bureaucratization as best practices for the coordination of transitional justice and peacebuilding initiatives are taken up by the global institutions associated with post-conflict peacebuilding and development assistance that have the tendency to operate through standardized templates. 2 9 It has been argued that as transitional justice practices have spread around the world, they have done so not necessarily by adapting themselves de novo to each new context, but through a process of "acculturation" whereby a dominant script or practice is replicated again and again as a result of repeated information exchanges and consultations. 3 ' Once a dominant paradigm or script develops, modifying that script to suit new conditions or circumstances can be extremely challenging. 3 ' In the context of internationally driven peacebuilding initiatives more generally, the existence of "set templates" and a "formulaic path" has similarly been observed.'
32 Given these tendencies, there is reason to worry that-notwithstanding paeans to national ownership and contextappropriate solutions-as transitional justice is mainstreamed into emerging best practices for post-conflict reconstruction, transitional justice initiatives will come to be seen as yet another item on the "post-conflict checklist," a mechanistic part of the template deployed in the context of post-conflict peace operations."' That post-conflict peacebuilding and transitional justice initiatives have frequently been criticized for being planned and implemented in a top-down, externally driven, and Western-biased manner, only serves to highlight the concern of standardization.34 Third, as explored in Section III of this Article, international peacebuilding programs, as well as a number of transitional justice initiatives, have frequently been subject to powerful, parallel critiques, including the critique of liberal international peacebuilding, the critique of politics as neutral technology, and concerns about striking the right balance between the local and the international in post-conflict programming. Considered together with the danger of overstandardization, there is reason to worry that better integration and coordination between peacebuilding and transitional justice, especially insofar as it is carried out by the large bureaucracies traditionally associated with post-conflict assistance, might actually exacerbate some of the tendencies that have given rise to these parallel critiques rather than alleviate them. At a minimum, given historic patterns, there is no reason to think that simply linking peacebuilding and transitional justice, without more, will do anything to counter these tendencies.
Given the potential problems and challenges inherent in attempting to build stronger linkages between peacebuilding and transitional justice initiatives, it would not be unreasonable to question the compatibility of more integrated approaches involving a strong international role with the types of locally owned, context-specific, and bottom-up solutions suggested by the critiques that have arisen in the academic and policy literature. 35 On the other hand, from a pragmatic and realist standpoint, a balance between local and international agency in post-conflict programming seems both inevitable and desirable, due in part to the resources and expertise that internationals can at times bring to bear.' 36 With this perspective in mind, as scholars, practitioners, and policymakers begin to take a greater interest in sounding out potential linkages, viewing transitional justice and peacebuilding overlaps through the prism of the critiques and concerns outlined in this Article should prove instructive. Attentiveness to some of the parallel critiques and concerns that have been raised could lead to shifts that would strengthen policy in both areas in the process of promoting linkages.
(observing that, together with other international interventions, "transitional justice practices have commonly become part of a longer list of 'tickboxes' to attain peace and security').
134 See Section III. 135 Sec Section III.
136 See Arriaza and Roht-Arriaza, 2 Intl J Transitional Just at 153 (cited in note 21) (arguing for strategies that "incorporate a perspective that encompasses bottom-up local efforts as well as topdown state-driven or internationally driven ones").
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Ultimately, promoting linkages that reflect a cognizance of critique might involve more hybridized forms of peacebuilding and transitional justice that involve a mixture of conventional and local practices and models. 3 For example, as previously discussed, DDR programs and transitional justice initiatives have the potential to both conflict with and complement each other, and careful coordination is called for if. synergies are to be exploited. One of the areas where DDR programs have had the least amount of success is in the community reintegration element, sometimes known as the forgotten "R" of DDR, or the "the weakest link in the DDR chain." '38 This is an area where the reconciliation components of transitional justice initiatives might serve as a potential bridge, strengthening both DDR and transitional justice goals in the process. 139 The potential use of local ritual and tradition in facilitating reconciliation generally and the reintegration of former combatants specifically might be one way of building linkages between transitional justice and DDR programs that gives deference to the critiques and concerns that have in the past plagued both fields (including that they are Western-biased and externally driven).) + Such approaches to reintegration have seen limited but intriguing use in Sierra Leone and Mozambique.' Similarly, in East Timor, a post-conflict community reconciliation process combined aspects of arbitration and mediation grounded in local ritual in bringing former perpetrators and combatants into dialogue with their estranged communities and victims.
14 2 In the future, it might be possible for coordinating bodies like the PBC to encourage the use of local ritual and tradition to bridge the gap between DDR and transitional justice. This could, of course, be a difficult needle to thread since too much international involvement in such affairs might be seen to co-opt or 137 corrupt the authenticity of local practices. Nevertheless, the PBC could play a helpful role even if only to brief local constituencies as to the range of local ritual that has been successfully used in other contexts.
While this is but one example, we should be attentive to similar possibilities as we contemplate promoting greater linkages between peacebuilding and transitional justice. This Article does not attempt to set forth a comprehensive approach along these lines, but there are possibilities ripe for exploration. One such example might be the use of "bottom-up" approaches to rule of law assistance that attempt to effect reforms though grassroots legal empowerment.
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Another such example could be more comprehensive approaches to transitional justice and SSR programs that give greater emphasis to accountability for economic crimes and economic violence perpetrated in the course of the conflict. 1 " Additional possibilities that would cut against the grain of longstanding critiques of transitional justice and peacebuilding need to be developed by academics, practitioners, and policymakers going forward.
V. CONCLUSION
Though historically seen as being in competition with the demands of peace, transitional justice is increasingly accepted as an important element of post-conflict peacebuilding. Along with the demobilization and disarmament of ex-combatants, security sector reform, rule of law programs, and elections, it has now joined a virtual checklist of post-conflict interventions spearheaded by the international community in post-conflict countries. This increasingly shared space between transitional justice and post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives has sparked new interest among both scholars and policymakers in sounding out potential connections between both fields. Although the pursuit of synergies between peacebuilding and transitional justice programs is a worthwhile goal, in developing these connections, we must also be keenly attentive to mutual shortcomings. Transitional justice and post-conflict peacebuilding have historically proceeded on separate tracks, yet there has been a remarkable similarity in the critiques and concerns that have been leveled against both fields in the last two decades. There are strong reasons to suspect that more integrated approaches to peacebuilding and transitional justice will have the tendency to exacerbate some of the tendencies that have given rise to these parallel critiques 143 See generally Golub, 20 Camb Rev Intl Aff 47 (cited in note 124).
144 See generally Sharp, 35 Fordham Int LJ 780 (cited in note 78) (discussing the peripheral status of economic violence and economic justice in mainstream transitional justice initiatives); see also Carranza, 2 Intl J Transitional Just at 310 (cited in note 53) (arguing that transitional justice must do more to grapple with corruption and other economic crimes that may have helped to precipitate the conflict).
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Shaqp rather than alleviate them. Seeking synergies and overlaps through the optics of these historic concerns and critiques could be one technique of resistance to these tendencies. To be sure, exploiting overlaps while addressing critiques and pushing back against long dominant paradigms would bring its own challenges. At the same time, such efforts could take us one step forward in moving beyond the post-conflict checklist and toward the development of more holistic and innovative approaches to the challenge of building peace with justice in conflict's wake.
